purpose was to assess the extent of relationships between Peirce and his pupils, students, collaborators, as well as successors and inheritors, together with the wider aims of establishing to what extent these notions themselves might call for historical and philosophical clarifi cation when it comes to the legacies of great minds.
Th e opening paper "Second Metaphysical Club and its general signifi cance to the development of American science" was by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen. Now it has sometimes been claimed that, unlike many other classic thinkers, Charles Peirce had few or even no intellectual heirs. Although he held no permanent academic position in his entire life, Peirce led the Baltimore Metaphysical Club in 1879-1883 and instructed a famous circle of students of logic and philosophy at Johns Hopkins University during those years. He lectured throughout his life, developed correspondence courses and collaborated with a number of scientists. For example, it was his joint work with his student Joseph Jastrow that came to defi ne what became the fi eld of experimental psychology. A wealth of historical evidence abounds which testifi es to the impact of the works and collaborations Peirce had during the Johns Hopkins era.
Furthermore, Peirce's massive correspondence reveals that many were eager to learn from his tuition. He wrote long responses and designed the courses with attention to detail, even to that of teaching and pedagogy, although the delivery may not have been entirely successful on site. Th anks to the eff orts of Ladd-Franklin and many other students of his, a Peircean school of logic may have been in the making already in his lifetime, naturally with lively debates on what such a new logic should look like. Th ese and many other issues thus appear to invite a closer investigation of Peirce's legacy as evidenced by his students, including John Dewey, Allan Marquand, Fabian Franklin, Christine Ladd-Franklin, Oscar Howard Mitchell, Benjamin Ives Gilman, Joseph Jastrow, Ellery W. Davis, Th orstein Veblen, Josiah Royce, Washington Irving Stringham and Henry Taber.
Th e workshop prompted questions such as: How do Peirce's teachings show up in the careers of Dewey, James, and others? What was Peirce's overall infl uence on his colleagues and collaborators? What was his own place in academia and those of his research groups? What was the impact of the Metaphysical Club on the development of science and philosophy? What was the nature of the Peircean lineage in logic? What, in fact, was Peirce's real infl uence on Ramsey and on the Cambridge (UK) community? What was Welby's signifi cs in comparison to Peirce's, and what was the real reception of pragmaticism in Peirce's own lifetime?
Th e day in Tallinn continued with lively sessions on semiotics and perception. At the Helsinki end, the day began with a workshop on theorematic reasoning, organized by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, with Frederik Stjernfelt as an invited speaker. Stjernfelt presented a new classifi cation of theorematic reasoning types, published and presented in detail in his new book Natural Propositions (Docent Press, 2014) . Two more workshops were held during the second day: one on abduction organized by Sami Paavola and the other on Peirce and the social sciences organized by Mats Bergman. Lively discussions ensued. Th e contributed talks were grouped in the sessions on history of science and epistemology, and science and inquiry.
Two plenary talks were presented on the evening of the second day, one by Helmut Pape entitled "Compulsions, forces and assertions: Peirce on the semiotics of rhetorics" and the other by Jaakko Hintikka with the title "Th e place of Peirce in the history of logic". According to Pape, Peirce's rhetoric was a bouquet of confl icting conceptions ranging from truth-enhancing methods of research and representation (Peirce's methodeutic) to a general theory of conditions of understanding and communication (Peirce's universal rhetoric). Pape argued that contrary to appearances, Peirce developed some of these approaches in more detail than has previously been recognized. Pape then presented a wealth of detailed rhetorical considerations that are present in semiotics, most importantly the dialogical one, which could also be termed the game-theoretical model of the meaning of assertions, albeit one in which the interaction should be seen as taking place in a cooperative mood.
Hintikka proceeded to argue that Peirce's work is relevant to the future of logical theory in several diff erent respects. He began by presenting the celebrated question: Is there a curtain between language and the world ('language as a universal medium' , a view that used to be predominant in the past), or is language a tool for representation ('language as calculus' , or the model-theoretic view, which emerged much later)? Hintikka noted how Peirce's logic is grounded on important semiotic and semantic views, of which Tarski, having held a certain static view on semantics, did not manage to say nearly everything there is to be said. Peirce's pictorial view, his view on the dynamic nature of the language-world relations, is created and maintained by human institutions, stated Hintikka, and mentioned how Peirce's logic of quantifi ers was an explicitly game-theoretic one in which quantifi ers do not simply 'range over' the objects in the universe of discourse: through their formal dependencies they express the actual dependencies of their variables on each other. He then identifi ed a dramatic development in the history of logic, namely that Frege did not understand the all-important dependence-indication of quantifi ers, and so what came to be regarded as proper fi rst-order logic is seriously fl awed. Hintikka noted that another correction also is needed: Peirce was aware of the basic problematic concerning the role of quantifi ers in a logical theory, though he did not spell it out fully. In a striking contrast to Frege, whose logic was not fully adequate to account for the reasoning as exhibited in the mathematics of his time, Peirce even managed to correct errors that some mathematicians were led to in the light of the analysis that the dependence-indication of quantifi ers can bring out. According to Hintikka, logic calls for experimentation on diff erent kinds of structures and models, systematizing, among others, the study and analysis of thought experiments. He then pointed out the importance of icons in logical theorizing, such as the logic of existential graphs, and articulated the diff erence between the corollarial and theorematic reasoning in terms of how many individuals are needed in models: the reasoning is corollarial when there is no need for new individuals, while it is theorematic when new individuals need to be introduced. Th is was what Peirce called his "fi rst real discovery in logic". Hintikka also mentioned connections of these topics with the theory of computation, such as the length of proofs and the P vs. NP problem. What makes reasoning non-trivial thus aff ects the status of decision problems, among others.
Many more papers of vital importance were presented in nine diff erent sessions which cannot even briefl y be described in a short report. In summary, the conference explored the manifold applicability of Peirce's thought to current questions and problems in various disciplines across the sciences and the arts. Th e aims of the meeting, namely to identify where some of the leading edge on Peirce studies in connection to fi elds in sciences and arts is to be found, were largely met. Th e Applying Peirce conference testifi ed that Peirce's thought is very much in touch with living science, representing a fi eld of research and not, as Max Fisch and Nicholas Rescher have aptly formulated, "the strife of systems". Th e end-of-the-day discussions during the much-due reception time were facilitated by the three types of Peirce wines that Helmut Pape's Vinosofi a produced in Bamberg, Germany, savoured with the three types of Roquefort cheese (Peirce's own favourite brand of cheese) selected and fl own over from France by Peirce experts for this sole purpose.
Th e conference was sponsored by the Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance in Tallinn 
